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Replies 
(IN RE: E&A 11/4, Rowan's reply 
to Cave's review of Russow's "Why Do 
Species Matter?") 
In his reply to my review, Mr. 
Andrew Rowan charges me (and Rus­
sow) with making a "semantic error" 
in speaking of the aesthetic value of a 
species. It is Mr. Rowan's reply, 
rather, which is semantically con­
fused. There is no error in speaking 
of the aesthetic value of a species in 
terms of human perceptions of beauty. 
It is Mr. Rowan who stretches the 
meaning of "aesthetic value" beyond 
all reasonable bounds in contending 
that visually unattractive species 
"have aesthetic value as parts of the 
ecosystem." The example which he 
gives of the consequences of wantonly 
destroying such species certainly 
establishes their ecological value, but 
there is no reason whatsoever to 
characterize this value as "aesthetic." 
This is simply metaphorical claptrap. 
The unity and balance within a 
healthy ecosystem might be viewed as 
analogous, in some respects, to the 
unity and balance within an object of 
beauty, but it is absu rd to attribute 
"aesthetic value" to a particular spec­
ies simply because it is an essential 
part of that ecosystem. 
Mr. Rowan next proceeds to 
argue, unconvincingly, for the relativ­
ity of aesthetic value in the traditional 
sense of beauty. I will not dispute 
the issue here as to whether beauty is 
subjective or objective. It is not nec­
essary, however, to maintain that 
beauty is relative in order to draw 
the conclusion which he draws, 
namely, that "a species should not be 
confined to a moral limbo" on asethetic 
grounds. This, indeed, was the 
whole point of my criticism of Russow, 
and it is astonishing that Rowan could 
have so misconstrued my review as to 
accuse me of precisely what I was 
criticizing. We evidently both wish to 
safeguard the moral status of animals 
against reduction to aesthetic criteria. 
We differ only in the way we want to 
do it. Rowan wants to expand the 
concept of aesthetics to incl ude the 
pseudo-science of "ecological aesthet­
ics. " My contention is that the dem­
onstration of ecological value -- aesth­
etic or otherwise -- fails to safeguard 
the rights of animals and at bottom is 
just as speciesist and homocentric as 
the aesthetic value criterion in the 
narrower sense which he rejects. I 
have yet to see an ecological argument 
for animal rights which is rooted in 
genuine moral concern for individual 
animals rather than (ultimately) a con­
cern for man's own survival. 
George P. Cave� 
Unlimited�Trans-Species  
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(IN RE: E&A 11/4, Frey's reply 
to Johnson's review of Frey's Inter­
ests and Rights) 
Reply to Frey 
I am grateful for Frey's careful 
elucidation of the intentions of his 
skeptical book, Inte..!'...!!.ts and B.l9J:Lt.!: 
The .Case ~9ainst Animals. I hope a 
few more remarks of mine may help to 
advance discussion. 
I have considerable sympathy for 
various forms of moral skepticism, and 
I would certainly not dismiss any of 
Frey's interesting questions just for 
being startling or perverse. When 
Frey asks, for example, why we 
should think that pain is intrinsically 
bad, I perk up immediately: that 
sounds like a deep question. It may 
be so deep, in fact, as to be unans­
werable. Reflection on such matters 
might nevertheless serve to tu rn ou r 
entire moral thinking into a new direc­
tion, or even incline us to give up 
moral thin king altogether (probably 
not) . Still, it is important not to get 
confused about the practical conse­
quences of theoretical obstacles. If 
the badness of pain is a theoretical 
problem, it is one for humans as well 
as nonhumans. If we were reflecting 
on the people who are bei ng tortu red 
right now, or the people who are at 
this very moment starving, it would 
be odd to allow the theoretical ques­
tion of why pain is bad to derail us 
completely, if we were trying to make 
some headway in thinkihg about prac­
tical social policy. In the human 
case, of course, this is obvious, and 
so we don't have much difficulty sepa­
rating our reflections into appropriate 
layers. !! pain bad? doesn't mess us 
up when we are asking Is torture 
ever OK? I worry, though ,about the 
nonhuman case, because it is so easy 
to take a deep theoretical difficulty as 
an excuse for facile practical 
solutions. 
Do animals feel pain? Do animals 
have interests? Is pain (intrinsically) 
bad? I take it that Frey's answers to 
these questions are: Yes, No,and 
Maybe not, respectively-.- I would 
have thought that the answer to the 
fi rst question (niggling neo-cartesian 
niceties aside) would be Yes indeed I 
In his book Frey does deny "that-'ani­
mals have any of the following: 
interests, desires, beliefs, language, 
perceptions, reasons, emotions, moral 
feelings. Nevertheless, he allows that 
at least the "higher" animals can "suf­
fer unpleasant sensations" and so can 
be "hurt". That, presumably, is 
what we have in mind when we are 
concerned about animals feeling pain. 
But if we are confident about this 
fact, then what exactly is the signifi­
cance of the other questions? 
It doesn't matter much if non­
humans don't have interests or rights 
unless (a) humans do, and (b) that 
difference justifies differential- treat­
ment. Traditional arguments denying 
animals rights did assume a and b. 
Frey may not be makings those 
assumptions, and I applaud that. But 
what's the upshot? 
Frey says that "the very way 
Johnson writes, of how animal welfare 
ought to be weighed against human 
welfare, obscures the upshot that my 
attack on criteria for conferring moral 
standing can or does have, namely, 
that unless this attack can be 
deflected, it is not clear that a par­
ticular theorist, in terms of his own 
theory, has anything to put on the 
animal side of the balance." If ani­
mals have no interests, Frey sug­
gests, then there is nothing for theo­
rists such as Feinberg and Singer to 
put "on the animal side to weighed 
against and to impede the pu rsuit of 
human interests". - ­
I must admit I am a little puzzled 
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by this. If animals can suffer 
unpleasant sensations and so can be 
hurt, in a way that demands justifica­
tion (as Frey admits), then don't ani­
mals have a welfare, a welfare that 
requires moral consideration? I am 
not particularly concerned (now) to 
tussle over the word 'welfare', or 'in­
terest'. The point is just that there 
certainly seems to be something to 
weigh against human interests-­
-namely, the (fact of the) suffering 
(or whatever you want to call those 
unpleasant sensations) of nonhumans. 
Is the (fact of the) suffering of non­
humans unable to "impede the pursuit 
of human interests "? I don't see 
why. 
The fact that Frey emphasizes 
the phrase 'in terms of his own theo­
.!:i. suggestS-the following argument: 
although animals-not- having-unplea­
sant-sensations does count, it cannot 
fit into the theories of Feinberg and 
Singer because it isn't an interest, 
and thei r theories balance interests 
against interests (nor can it fit into 
Regan's theory because it isn't a 
right, etc.). Frey says, near the 
end of his reply, that "a theorist 
cannot weigh what he cannot get into 
his theory in the first place, and if 
my attack on the criteria for moral 
standing succeeds, then we 
have strong grounds for thinking he 
cannot encompass animals within his 
theory" . 
But what prevents, say, Singer 
from weighing animals-not-having-un­
pleasant-sensations against various 
human interests, whether one chooses 
to call what the animals have 'inter­
ests' or not? Singer talks in terms of 
weighing interests against interests 
because he thinks that animals-not­
having-unpleasant-sensations is an 
interest that animals have. Frey 
argues in his book that it is not an 
interest, if 0teres-.! is properly ana­
lyzed. Suppose rp"ur~~ for the sake 
of argument) that it isn t an interest. 
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That doesn't show that Singer can't 
weigh it against human interests. 
In the fi nal footnote in Interests 
and Rights: The Case Against Ani­
mals, Frey says this: "If one does 
come to agree that wantonly inflicting 
unpleasant sensations on animals is 
wrong, then an opponent may try . . 
. to base the moral case for boycot­
ting meat upon the pain and suffering 
animals endure on factory farms, 
without bringing in any or any 
explicit concerns with interests. " 
This possibility, says Frey, he is 
dealing with in an unpublished book 
on Modern Moral Vegetarianism. I 
haven It yet seen how he deals with it, 
but that is the position that must be 
dealt with and is not in Interests and 
Rights, which is why I said in my 
review that Frey hadn't really pre­
sented a case against animals. If 
there was such a case, I felt, it had 
yet to be presented. I look forward 
to Frey's next attempt. 
Johnson�Edward  
Orleans�University of New  
(IN RE: E&A \1/2, Devine's reply 
to Gruzalski's review of Devine's "The 
Moral Basis of Vegetarianism") 
Response to Devine 
In "The Moral Basis of Vegetari­
anism," Philip Devine argued that 
there is neither a utilitarian nor a 
deontological justification for being a 
vegetarian. In my criticism of his 
account, I focused only on his misap­
plication of utilitarianism. In his arti­
cle, Devine had argued (a) that "ani­
mal experience is so lacking in 
intensity that the pains of animals are 
overriden by the pleasu res experi­
enced by human beings"(49l). In 
order to use (a) to reach the conclu­
sion that eating animals was permissi­
ble on utilitarian grounds, Devine 
assumed (b) that an action which 
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produces more pleasure than suffering 
is permissible on utilitarian grounds. 
In my criticism of Devine's apology for 
conventional omnivore behavior, I 
showed (a') that Devine's reasons for 
thinking that animal experience lacks 
intensity did not support the claim he 
was making. In particular, Devine 
argued that conceptual richness makes 
human experiences more intense, but I 
showed that conceptual richness often 
makes human experiences less intense 
and also tends to make nonhuman suf­
fering extremely intense because non­
human suffering is unmitigated by 
rationalization, distraction, or aware­
ness of its purpose (this point is also 
made in Alternatives to Pain, D. 
Pratt, pp-.--14-15). Devine· also 
argued that because animals cannot 
!!y. to us that they are in pain, weY
may be justified in thinking that their 
pains are less intense. But, again, if 
there is a problem about knowing 
whether another sentient being is in 
great pain, this problem will not be 
solved by discovering that the crea­
tures utters the statement 'It hurts a 
lot'. That some beings are able to 
replace loud screams or whining 
cringes with an utterance does not 
alter ou r justification for thin king the 
being is in great pain. It is true 
that we may have to become very fami­
lar with some kinds of nonhuman ani­
mals in order to gain sufficient exper­
tise to calibrate those pains that are 
minor from their point of view, but 
this does not support any weakening 
of the utilitarian justification of vege­
tarianism, since, as far as we can 
tell, the sufferings of nonhuman ani­
mals as they are raised and slaugh­
tered for thei r flesh are as intense as 
any pains suffered by human animals. 
Although this is sufficient to under­
mine Devine's attack on the utilitarian 
justification for vegetarianism, ~ also 
showed (b') that the crucial utilitarian 
calculation is not whether an action 
will produce more pleasu re than pain, 
but whether there is !!!y. alternative 
to the action in question that would 
eroduce better results than the action 
in guestion. If there is an alternative 
that would likely produce less pain 
and more pleasure on the whole, then 
that is the action to be performed and 
to do otherwise is to perform a wrong 
action. Hence, when calculating the 
amount of human pleasu re produced 
by eating flesh, the utilitarian is only 
interested in the amount of pleasure 
that would not occur were we to eat 
tasty vegetables but ~ occurs 
because of eating meat. Since there 
is excellent evidence for thinking that 
the amount of pleasure lost by eating 
only vegetables hovers between the 
minimal and the nonexistent, it follows 
that the vegetarian alternative is man­
dated by utilitarianism, for a minimal 
or nonexistent amount of pleasure 
would never outweigh the animal suf­
fering required to put flesh on the 
table. 
In his reply, Devine answers nei­
ther criticism, although either under­
mines his claim to have shown that 
vegetarianism does not have a solid 
and compelling moral basis. Devine 
does repeat a weak version of (a), 
viz., "the precise issue is the weight 
to be given the impoverished concep­
tual structu re of animal experience." 
Of cou rse, this is even fu rther off 
the mark, since what is at stake is 
the value we are to place on animal 
suffering, regardless of "conceptual 
structure" or abilities to verbalize. 
Rather than address criticisms (a') 
and (b'), Devine attacks hedonistic 
utilitarianism, claiming that hedonistic 
utilitarianism culminates in "the rejec­
tion of utilitarianism as a moral sys­
tem. " That is news to those who 
articulate and defend hedonistic ver­
sions of utilitarianism. Surprisingly, 
in the same paragraph Devine decides 
to engage in "playing utilitarianism" 
italics mine and so claims that he is 
entitled "to exploit the complexities of 
suffering and enjoyment." But that 
depends. If what he means is that 
there is some theory he can articulate 
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that is utilitarian according to a text­
book definition and that on this 
theory eating animal flesh is permissi­
ble, what would this show? Any 
strawman account could be con­
structed, labeled 'utilitarian', and fail 
to justify our obligations to animals 
(e. g., imagine a theory in which the 
only experiences that count among the 
consequences of our actions are the 
experiences of the human and the 
divine). There is, unfortunately, no 
paucity of inaccu rate and strawman 
accounts of utilitarianism in the "Iiter­
atu re". If . Devine is truly interested 
in the question of whether utilitarian­
ism prescribes vegetarianism, he 
would consider carefully the strongest 
utilitarian accounts, among which is 
hedonistic utilitarianism. 
That Devine has failed to con­
sider seriously my criticism of the 
reasons he offered for (a) suggests 
that he has no response or, perhaps, 
that he was distracted, as we humans 
often are. That Devine does not 
respond to my criticisms of (b) sug­
gests that he does not take utilitarian­
ism seriously enough to examine one 
of its defensible forms. But for those 
who do want to get the issue straight, 
it is worth keeping in mind that the 
utilitarian will at least consider the 
following in assessing any action: (I) 
the foreseeable consequences of the 
action and the foreseeable conse­
quences of the alternatives; (2) the 
likelihood of these foreseeable conse­
quences; (3) the value of these fore­
seeable consequences in terms of pain 
and pleasure for all the sentient 
beings affected. Since the foreseeable 
pleasu res of eating tasty vegetables 
do not produce the intense foreseeable 
sufferings that nonhuman animals 
experience in being raised and slaugh­
tered for food, these three considera­
tions constitute a strong case against 
eating meat or doing anything else 
that contributes to raising and slaugh­
tering other sentient beings for their 
flesh. 
Gruzalski
Bart  
Northeastern University

 
(IN RE: E&A 11/3 and 11/4, Cave's 
review of Russow's "Why Do Species 
Matter?" and Rowan's I"eply thereto.) 
and
Aesthetic Qualities  
Judgments
Moral  
In my article, "Why Do Species 
Matter?", , came to the conclusion 
that if there is a valid reason for pro­
tecting endangered species that goes 
at all beyond the duties we might 
have not to harm or kill any animal of 
comparable type, that reason can only 
be grounded in an aesthetic apprecia­
tion of individuals of that species. 
This somewhat disappointing conclu­
sion was reached by eliminating the 
alternatives, and noting that the rea­
sons with which we were left were 
adequate to explain some of our puzz­
ling intuitions about this complex 
issue. However, in their reviews of 
this article, both George Cave (E&A 
11/3, pp. 63-65) and Andrew Rowan 
(E&A 11/4, pp. 92-93) take exception 
with this conclusion. Since thei r rea­
sons for doing so seem at first to be 
quite different, I shall consider thei r 
objections one at a time. However, I 
will end by suggesting that there 
might be a common concern underlying 
both men's apparently disparate criti­
cisms. 
Dr. Rowan's objection seems to be 
that an aesthetic judgment is subjec­
tive, and hence untrustworthy; he 
would prefer to tie ou r moral obliga­
tions to something he refers to as 
"ecological aesthetics." If this phrase 
is meant to suggest that a creature's 
adaptation to its envi ronment, its uni­
que ecological fitness, might inspire 
aesthetic feelings of admiration and 
wonder, I would certainly agree with 
him, and acknowledged this facet of 
our aesthetic evaluation in my original 
article (p. 109,111). If, on the 
other hand, he means that we ought 
to recognize that an animal has some 
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other sort of value which accrues to it 
in virtue of its occupying a certain 
role in the ecosystem, then his sug· 
gestion does not differ obviously from 
the claim I considered in my article, 
and rejected on the grounds that it 
simply does not yield the conse­
quences that its proponents claim to 
generate. In particular, it does not 
support that conclusion that all, or 
even most, species can be shown to 
be valuable on this criterion (pp. 
106-108), 
Mr. Cave's objections are consider­
ably more subtle, but I believe that 
they, too, can be answered. The 
fi rst objection is that my proposed 
solution is "thoroughly speciesist" (p. 
63) and the second is that my solution 
rests on a confusion between those 
featu res that provide psychological 
motivation for an action, and that that 
provide moral justification for it. 
Underlying both these points is an 
issue about which Cave and I disa­
gree: the question of whether a 
thing's aesthetic value has any bear­
ing on moral judgments about actions 
which affect that thing. Cave explic­
itly rejects the idea that "beauty has 
moral value", claiming that this tenet 
is "a moral disaster" that has been 
used to justify such clearly immoral 
actions as slave labor (p. 64). Cave 
is correct in ascribing to me the 
opposite point of view; my position 
does, as he clearly sees, presuppose 
that a thing's being beautiful might be 
used to justify the claim that we have 
a moral obligation to preserve it. I, 
acknowledge that beauty ought not to 
be taken as the sole ground for moral 
value (i. e. that-other considerations 
might outweigh a particular obligation 
based solely on aesthetic value--cf. p. 
111 of the original article). I grant, 
too, that history and imagination can 
provide examples in which appeals to 
aesthetic value are used in attempts to 
justify immoral activities. Neither of 
these considerations, however, 
provides any reason for thinking that 
beauty, or aesthetic value more gen­
erally, should play no role in our 
moral deliberations. Indeed, our intu­
itions certainly lead us to think that 
they should: someone who defiles a 
great work of art is normally consid­
ered to have done something immoral. 
A full exploration of the relation 
between aesthetic and moral value 
would require a paper (at least) of its 
own, but I believe it is sufficient for 
the present purposes to note that 
Cave has not supplied adequate reason 
to warrant abandoning the intuition 
that aesthetic value can support some 
claims about moral obligations. 
If; however, I am justified in 
appealing to aesthetic value as one 
possible component in our moral delib­
erations, then both of Cave's specific 
objections lose their force. As I 
understand the word 'speciesist', it is 
not speciesist to appeal to a human 
value--i. e., to argue that something 
has moral worth because it is valuable 
to humans--as long as it is not 
assumed that any human value will 
outweigh nonhuman concerns. Thus, 
if animals have a right to life, it 
would certainly seem speciesist to 
claim that it is morally permissible to 
ignore that right in cases where we 
simply found the animal ugly. I did 
nothing of this sort in my arguments 
concerning endangered species; my 
appeal to aesthetic value was pre­
sented as something which might sup­
plement those moral concerns which 
apply to any individual animal of a 
give type, which might plausibly 
explain those conerns for endangered 
species which extend beyond the moral 
considerations governing our treatment 
of cows, dogs, blackbirds, and labo­
ratory rats. 
.As to the second objection, it 
would seem that if aesthetic considera­
tions are morally relevant, they can 
legitimately act both as psychological 
motivation and as an element in moral 
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justification. We might well wish to 
keep the distinction between motiva­
tion and justification in mind, espe­
cially if one is to deal with questions 
about cases in which an agent fails to 
recognize that something is beautiful, 
or cases in which mistakes in aesthetic 
judgments are made, but that, I take 
it, is not Cave's point. Rather, he 
seems to think that if something is a 
psychological motivation to act, it 
cannot be part of the moral justifica­
tion for that act; I can see no reason 
to accept this premise. 
Both Cave's and Rowan's objections 
seem as if they might be linked to a 
worry that ou r aesthetic judgments 
might, after all, be an unreliable 
guide to moral action. Cave suggests 
that over-concern with beauty can 
lead to speciesist perspectives and 
immoral actions. Rowan quotes Hume 
in order to suggest that aesthetics 
supplies a very limited perspective 
and "flimsy and subjective grounds" 
for our moral judgments (p. 93). All 
of this may be true; aesthetic judg­
ments are notoriously hard to pin 
down, and we· certainly have much 
work to do in the a rea of aesthetic 
value and its role in ethics. Nonethe­
less, if my original arguments are 
correct, it's the only game in town as 
far as endangered species are con­
cerned. 
Russow�Lilly-Marlene  
University�Pu rdue  
